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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 agreement, entered on February 8, 2011, Defendant Dennis

0. Cox pled guilty to an amended charge of Injury to Child, Idaho Code§ 18-1501(1). (Rat 56).

In exchange for a guilty plea, the State agreed that it would dismiss all other charges against Mr.
Cox, that the Court would order a presentence investigation, consistent with Idaho Criminal Rule
32, and the State would recommend to the Court no harsher penalty then recommended by the
presentence investigator. (R at 56-58). The District Court was bound, by this Rule 11 agreement,
to sentence no harsher than what was recommended by the presentence investigator. (R at 5658). The presentence investigator recommended incarceration in the presentence report dated
April 20, 2011. (R at PSI). Correspondingly, the District Court sentenced to ten years unified,
three years fixed, seven years indeterminate on or about June 30, 2011. (R at 99). A Rule 35
motion is pending with the District Court.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
On or about October 7, 2010, Dennis 0. Cox was charged, via criminal complaint, with

one count of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under Sixteen pursuant to Idaho Code§ 18-1508, and
one count of Rape, in alleged violation of Idaho Code§ 18-6101(4). (Rat 1-2). On or about
October 26, 2010, a Stipulation for Own Recognizance Release Pursuant to Terms was submitted
to the Magistrate Judge, replacing the $200,000 bond that was entered, and subjecting Mr. Cox
to a Global Positioning System (GPS) monitor. (Rat 23-24). A preliminary hearing was held on
November 16, 2010, and Mr. Cox was bound over to the District Court. (Rat 30-31). Mr. Cox
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was arraigned before the District Court on November 30, 2010, and entered not guilty pleas. (R
at 38). At the jury pretrial on February 8, 2011, the Court was presented a binding Rule 11
agreement. (Rat 52). Mr. Cox pled guilty to one reduced count of Injury to Child, Idaho Code§
18-1501(1). (R at 52).

The Court ordered a psychosexual evaluation (and full disclosure

polygraph) with Dr. Kenneth Lindsey, and set sentencing for April 28, 2011. (R at 52-53). On
April 7, 2011, by request of Mr. Cox, the Court continued sentencing until May 26, 2011. (Rat
64).
At the sentencing hearing on May 26, 2011, Mr. Cox objected to the presentence report
because it contained impermissible conjecture and speculation, prohibited by I.C.R. Rule 32. (Tr.
at 35-36). Initially, the Court granted Mr. Cox's objection, struck the presentence investigation,
and granted a new presentence investigation in another jurisdiction.

(Tr.

at 35-36).

Subsequently, after argument was made in chambers by the State, the Court overruled its prior
order to strike and allowed the State to call the presentence investigator to testify (at a later date)
as to why she found the conjecture and speculation reliable in making her recommendations.
(Tr. at 38). The Court requested briefing on the arguments. (R at 88-92).

At the sentencing hearing, the District Court allowed the presentence investigator to
testify as to why she relied on conjecture and speculation. (Tr. at 44). The Court overruled Mr.
Cox's request that the PSI be stricken. (Tr. at 112). The Court then redlined portions of the PSI,
thus striking those portions from the record. (Tr. at 112). The Court refused to disqualify itself,
and then entered a sentence of ten years unified, three years determinate, seven years
indeterminate. (various transcript, Rat 97).
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C.

STATEMENTOFFACTS

On September 25, 2010, E.S. presented to local law enforcement to report alleged sexual
abuse against Defendant Dennis 0. Cox (hereinafter "Dennis" or "Mr. Cox"). (R at 10).
According to her report, Dennis, approximately seven to eight years prior to disclosure, had
inappropriate contact of a sexual nature while E.S. was exercising at Dermis's gym. (R at 10).
She also stated that the she and Dennis had performed mutual sexual acts on one another, prior to
she reaching the age of 18. (R. at 10). She also alleged that Dennis forced her to have sex with
him after she had turned the age of eighteen. (Rat 11-12).
As a result of these allegations, Dennis was arrested in Salt Lake City (where he lived)
and was held for three weeks pending a bond hearing. 1 (R. at 18). Ultimately, Mr. Cox was
released on his own recognizance, but was required to wear an ankle monitor during his release. 2
(Rat 23-26). A contested preliminary hearing was held on November 16, 2010, and Dennis was
bound over to District Court. (R at 32). After the first of the year (2011), the Parties began
discussing potential resolutions of the case. Ultimately, the Parties agreed to a binding Rule 11
agreement, by which Dennis would plead guilty to one count of Injury to Child (reduced charge
from Lewd Conduct with a minor under the age of 16), the rape charge would be dismissed, and
that the State would recommend no harsher than what the presentence investigator would
recommend. (R at 56). On February 8, 2011, the binding Rule 11 agreement was submitted to
the Court, and relying on this agreement, Dennis pled guilty to one count of Injury to Child, and

1
2

Bond was set at $200,000 by a magistrate that ultimately recused himself due to a conflict of interest. (R at 18, 20).
Dennis never had a single violation of his GPS OR release, which was noted and acknowledged at his sentencing.
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Dennis was required to undergo a psychosexual evaluation with Dr. Kenneth Lindsey. (Rat 5259).

On May 11, 2011, the Court was sent a psychological evaluation from Dr. Lindsey. 3 In
the psychosexual evaluation, Dr. Lindsey relied upon a polygraph dated April 6, 2011, from
polygrapher Kirk Nelson. 4 In Dr. Lindsey's May 11, 2011 report, due to unexplained deception
in Mr. Cox's polygraph, Dr. Lindsey stated that Mr. Cox was an indeterminate risk for sexual
offending in the future. Id. Dr. Lindsey indicated that there was no forcible rape against the
victim (based on the polygraph results). Id. Dr. Lindsey indicated there were no other minor
victims (based on the polygraph results). Id.

Dr. Lindsey stated, "However, I am able to

determine what his minimum risk would be, or the case that what we know about him today
based on his disclosures is essentially all there is to know .... I rate Mr. Cox minimal risk level (is
lower bound risk level) as moderate-low." Id. Due to the lack of a non-deceptive polygraph, Dr.
Lindsey recommended, in this initial May 11, 2011 report, that Mr. Cox be incarcerated for
community protection purposes. Id.

This psychosexual evaluation was provided to the

presentence investigator. (R at Presentence Investigation).
As a result of the incomplete polygraphs, a hearing was held (at Mr. Cox's request) to
continue the sentencing in order for Dennis to submit to an additional polygraph to see if the
deception would be resolved. (Rat 64). The State vigorously opposed the motion, but the Court
granted the motion to continue. (R. at 64). Accordingly, the Court continued sentencing to May
26, 2011. (Rat 64). On or about May 4, 2011, Dennis presented to Kirk Nelson for a follow-up
3
4

Sealed exhibit, psychological evaluation of Dennis 0. Cox dated May 11, 2011.
Sealed exhibit, April 6, 2011 document Nelson's Truth Verification Testing and Investigations, LLC.
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polygraph. This second polygraph resolved some of the issues regarding deception, but not all.
Id. Dennis still showed deception on two questions:

"Are you know purposely hiding any important part of your sexual history from me?"
and;
"After your divorce were you the one who initiated contact with E.S. ?"
Id.

The presentence investigation was provided to defense counsel on or about May 19,
2011. (R at Presentence Investigation Report)

On May 26, 2011, the matter came on for

sentencing before the District Court. (Tr. at 18).

Dennis objected to the presentence

investigation as containing inappropriate conjecture and speculation. (Tr. at 19). The objection
was made as follows:
Counsel: Your Honor the Idaho Criminal Rule 32 states, "However, while not all
information in a presentence report need be in the form of sworn testimony and be
admissible in trial, conjecture and speculation should not be included in the
presentence report." That is a direct quote from Idaho Criminal Rule 35 [sic] by
which this presentence investigation was conducted.
Now I understand that a presentence investigator, pursuant to Rule 32, may
request information concerning social history and a marital status, but Your
Honor, there are assertions made in this report, particularly excerpts from letters
from ex-wives, letters from other individuals that have allegations that are frankly
and completely inappropriate for a presentence investigation. These allegations
and assertions go far beyond obtaining a social history; far beyond obtaining his
marital history. There are unsubstantiated allegations contained and implications
of abuse. There are unsubstantiated allegations and factually inaccurate assertions
of animal cruelty. There are implications of wrong doing. Furthermore, I think
that there is an inappropriate implication of religious impropriety that should

5

There is a report attached to the May 11, 2011 psychosexual evaluation in the sealed content of the file.
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never have been mentioned. Simply put, they have never been addressed or at
issue before this Court for sentencing.
And where this objection is particularly relevant, Your Honor, is that prior to this
individual conducting the presentence investigation, the presentence investigator
was told about the Rule 11 agreement in this case. So she knew that the Court
would be bound by what she recommended, and whether she was jaded by the
false, stinging and flat out allegations, Your Honor, all I can say is I can go
through line item by line item the excerpts and the objections that we have in this
presentence investigation and I can emphasis the areas of conjecture and
speculation. And I recognize that the Court has already read the presentence
investigation, and I know that this Court has to make a decision regarding
sentencing, and I am not really all that interested in going through these items and
putting a billboard over the top of these false allegations ....
Your Honor I am asking for a new presentence investigation and to postpone this
sentencing and to have a new [sic] presentence investigation underwent by a
different officer, possibly even in a different jurisdiction where this inappropriate
material is not considered ....
Of the presentence report there is an excerpt from the letter that was submitted by
Marcie Schwartz. There are allegations in here of, "I firmly believe that Dennis is
an experienced social predator who has years to perfect his destructive craft.
They insulate Dennis from suspicion and have enabled him to live a double life.
He can prey on the weak, the vulnerable, the young, in order to satisfy his most
salacious appetites while maintaining a false image of devoutness and decency.
Remove Dennis from the proximity of those he would exploit and ravage. What
[sic] should this man be allowed to perpetuate this great misery in the lives of
even more victims?"
The Court: And I will agree that there is a lot of conclusory type of language in
there without any facts to back it up.
Counsel: Correct.
The Court: Are you of the view that I cannot ascertain whether there is factual
support for any of this and give it the appropriate weight as I consider this
allegation and consider the sentencing in this matter?
Counsel: Where it is especially problematic in this case, is that we entered into a
Rule 11 where the Court would be bound to not sentence any harsher than the
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recommendations of the presentence investigator. Now it is not that I don't have
faith in this Court to give that conjecture and speculation the appropriate weight.
It isn't that, but I don't necessarily have that same faith in the presentence
investigator, and this information was considered-it was specifically cut and
pasted from these letters and put into that presentence investigation and there is
no question that jaded and tainted this investigator's recommendations. (Tr. at 1928).
After hearing arguments by both Parties, the Court went in to recess, reviewed relevant
case law, and returned with a ruling. (Tr. at 30). The Court ruled verbally:
The Court: . . . The Court has-this matter is set to proceed to sentencing today
with respect to Mr. Cox's previous plea of guilty to the crime of Felony Injury to
Child, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-1501(1). The Court has been presented
today before sentencing could occur a motion by defendant's counsel, Mr. Aaron
Thompson correct me if I am wrong, basically asking that the Court strike the
presentence investigation report in this matter, based upon claim be defendant that
it contains information that is inappropriate in presentence investigation reports
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 32, specifically subsection e one of that Rule.
It has also asked that the Court order that a new presentence investigation report
be completed incident to that motion. Is that a correct statement of the motion

that has been made at this time?
Counsel: Yes, Your Honor, that is accurate.
The Court: The state has opposed that motion. The Court in considering this
motion has taken this matter under advisement, has gone into chambers, I have rereviewed the Rule 11 Agreement that was entered into this matter. I think the
Rule 11 Plea Agreement does have some interplay with respect to this motion. As
I understand the Rule 11 Plea Agreement in this matter, the State agreed to amend
the charge of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child under the Age of Sixteen Years,
in exchange for Mr. Cox's plea of guilty to the charge of Felony Injury to Child.

It is further agreed that this agreement shall be presented to the Judge pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 11. If Judge Brown does not accept this agreement, Mr. Cox
has the ability to withdraw his plea of guilty and proceed to trial on the initial
charges that were brought.
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The terms and conditions of the plea agreement further provide-I can't find it
right now, but further provide that the State as well as the sentencing court in this
matter will be bound to follow the recommendations of the presentence
investigator who completes the presentence investigation and has the benefit of
the psychosexual evaluation. The Court and the State would then be bound by her
recommendations.
The Court's understanding of that plea agreement, of course, is that the Court
could do nothing more than what was recommended by the presentence
investigator. So if the presentence investigator recommended probation, the
Court could do nothing more than that without affording Mr. Cox an opportunity
to withdraw his guilty plea. If the presentence investigator recommended a
retained jurisdiction, the Court could not impose prison with affording Mr. Cox an
opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. So the presentence investigator and the
recommendations of that presentence investigator play a very significant role in
this sentencing process pursuant to the terms and conditions of the plea
agreement.
The Court incident to the plea agreement and the plea entered by Mr. Cox
subsequent to the submission of the plea agreement ordered that a psychosexual
evaluation, along with a presentence investigation report be completed in this
matter. Pursuant to Rule 32 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, the contents of a
presentence investigation report may include a number of items to provide the
Court with a sufficient information, background information, criminal
information, to make an informed judgment concerning the sentence that should
be imposed. Specifically Rule 32(b) of the Idaho Criminal Rules provides that the
Court can give consideration to the presentence investigation report should
include information, including a defendant's prior criminal record, as well as a
defendant's social history, including family relationships, marital status, age,
interests and activities. The Court certainly interprets this provision of the Idaho
Criminal Rules to include a background information and social history that would
solicit information and input from ex-wives and family members, and so the
Court sees nothing inappropriate or out of the ordinary with respect to the request
of presentence investigator going to Mr. Cox's ex-wives and asking them for
information that may be beneficial and may be pertinent under the Idaho Criminal
Rules of Civil Procedure or excuse me under the Idaho Criminal Rules to assist in
the preparation of a presentence investigation report.
Idaho Criminal Rule 32(b)(10) further provides that the presentence investigator's
analysis of the defendant's condition. That analysis of the defendant's condition
contained in the presentence report shall include a complete summary of the
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presentence investigator's view of the psychological factors surrounding the
commission of the crime or regarding the defendant individually which he
investigator discovers.
So certainly those areas identified and sought out through discussions and social
history with ex-wives and family members are appropriate considerations for the
Court to taken into consideration and the presentence investigator to include into a
presentence investigation.
The Court is also given consideration to the Court of Appeals decision in State of
Idaho v. Sensenig, that is found at 110 Idaho 83. In that case, the Court of
Appeals stated, "Under subdivision (e) of this Rule, information in a presentence
report can be stricken only if no reasonable basis exists to deem the information
reliable or the information is simply conjecture and speculation." Obviously that
is the contention of the defendant in this matter that there are significant portions
of the presentence investigation report specifically significant portions of two of
the ex-wives of Mr. Cox that contain a great deal of conjecture and speculation.
This issue has been discussed further in the case of State v. Mauro. This is found
at 121 Idaho 178. This is a Supreme Court decision. In that case, the Court stated
as follows, "While Idaho Criminal Rule 32(e) provides that the presentence report
may include information of a hearsay nature where the presentence investigator
believes that information is reliable, including material which would have been
inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence applicable at trial." The Rule precludes
the inclusion of conjecture and speculation. We conclude that a substantial
amount of information quoted above without some explanation by the presentence
investigator as to why he believes that information is reliable, was too speculative
or too conjectural to be considered in sentencing. The Court goes on to state that
without an explanation from the presentence investigator why he believed that the
hearsay information was reliable or an indication by the trial court that he was not
relying on it, we conclude that the presentence report contained too much
speculation and conjecture and too little support for why the presentence
investigator believed that the hearsay information was reliable to comply with
Idaho Criminal Rule 32.
These two cases provide the Court with some guidance but there is still a
component of this that is troubling to the Court. As stated in Mauro, the Court is
free at sentencing to state why I am not relying upon or why I reject certain
information that may be conjectural or speculative in nature, and I have the ability
and would be more than able to do what, rather than strike the report and do
something new with respect to this. The problem that is in place in this
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particular situation is that the interplay with the binding Rule 11 Plea
Agreement locks this Court in to any recommendation-locks the State in to
any recommendation that were to be made by the presentence investigator
and therefore, his or her call somewhat controls where the Court can go with
respect to this particular sentencing. That creates a component that wasn't
present in State v. Mauro which further complicates this analysis.
The Court does conclude that much of what is contained in the letters from
Mr. Cox's two ex-wives is purely conjectural in nature and is speculative.
The Court does conclude from my review of the presentence investigation report
as well as those letters that much of what that is, is just coniecture and are
just claims by the ex-wives supported by no factual information that the
presentence investigator could rely upon.
More importantly for the appellate analysis the presentence investigator has not
stated any reasons in the presentence investigation report itself why she believes
that those statements are reliable or should be considered as part of the record in
this sentencing. Based upon this matter, based upon this Court's concern
regarding its interpretation of Rule 32 or the Idaho Criminal Rules as well as the
case law interpreting that, specifically the State v. Mauro case and the interplay
that the language of that decision has with respect to the fact that this is a binding
Rule 11 Plea Agreement, and that the recommendations of the presentence
investigator are controlling upon the State's recommendations as well as the
sentencing discretion of the Court. The Court does feel that there are questions
regarding the legitimacy of the presentence investigation report.
To assure that this matter is not subject to appeal and reversal on appeal, the
Court feels that I have no choice at this point in time but to grant the
Defendant's motion to order that a new presentence investigation be
completed in this matter. I am going to ask that the presentence investigation
report be completed by a presentence investigator in the seventh judicial district.
I am going to order that this be stricken and I am going to-before I complete my
ruling I want to see counsel in chamber regarding on aspect of this Rule.
(Tr. at 30-36) (emphasis added).

After a meeting with the State and defense counsel in chambers, the State
convinced the Court to allow the presentence investigator come and defend her use of the
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conjecture and speculation. (Tr. at 37-40). Therefore, the Court rescheduled the matter
for another sentencing date. (Tr. at 40).
The Court also held that either party had the ability to contact Nicole Osborn, the
presentence investigator. (Tr. at 39). The Court also requested a submission of briefing
pertaining to the Idaho Criminal Rule 32 objection. (Tr. at 40).
Between May 26 and June 30, 2011, Mr. Cox underwent and additional polygraph
examination at his own expense. (R at 83). Mr. Cox's counsel sent an email, at the
conclusion of the new polygraph, to the psychosexual evaluator and carbon copied the
email to the State's attorney. (R at 83).

In the email, counsel requested that the

psychosexual evaluator review the updated polygraph, and, if the professionalism and
authenticity met the psychosexual evaluator's standards, requested that Dr. Lindsey
update his report. (Rat 83). Immediately thereafter, the State filed a Motion to Disallow
Consideration of Third Polygraph Examination by Court Ordered Evaluator. (R at 79).
Cox responded with an Objection to Motion to Disallow Consideration of Third
Polygraph Examination by Court Ordered Evaluator. (Rat 85). After hearing argument,
the Court denied the State's request to prohibit Dr. Lindsey from considering the third
polygraph examination. (Rat 94).
Correspondingly, Dr. Lindsey did review the third polygraph, and all though he
did have some reservations regarding the polygraph, found it to be acceptable and relied
upon it for an updated psychosexual evaluation. (See June 24, 2011, psychosexual
evaluation report). In this updated psychosexual evaluation report, Dr. Lindsey stated
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that a moderate to low risk of sexual re-offense. (Id).

On page 4 of Dr. Lindsey's

recommendations, Dr. Lindsey stated, "Addendum report findings do not appear to
indicate the need for incarceration of Mr. Cox for community protection purposes. Of
course the Court may choose to incarcerate him for other judicial purposes." (Id at 4).
Correspondingly, the addendum psychological evaluation (June 24, 2011) was forwarded
to the presentence investigator, Nicole Osborn. She testified that she received it, reviewed it,
that it made no impact on her recommendations at all. (Rat 80-81). The Court, prior to hearing,
reviewed the briefing of the Parties on the I.C.R. Rule 32 issue. The Court then allowed the
State to present Nicole Osborn has a witness, in her capacity as a presentence investigator. (Tr. at
46). She testified that she was aware of Idaho Criminal Rule 32, and that she had been trained
how to prepare appropriate Rule 32 reports. (R at 47). She was asked the question on direct
examination:
Q:
What about the issue of about speculation and conjecture? That-I am not
asking you to interpret the legal meaning of that but are you aware the Rule
regarding speculation and conjecture within presentence investigation reports?
A:
Yes.
Q:
What is your understanding of that?
A:
That again is difficult to understand, but to me if someone just calls out of
the blue and makes a statement I am not going to accept that unless I verify it.
(Tr. at 54) (emphasis added).

Although she is not a trained psychologist/psychiatrist, and had never met Mr. Cox
before, she made interpretations regarding Mr. Cox's body language and took an immediate
disliking to Mr. Cox. (Tr. at 63-64). She repeatedly stated that she felt that conjecture and
speculation differed from an opinion. (Tr. at 83). When cross examined as to the material in her
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presentence investigation report from the ex-wives, she did not believe that it was conjecture and
speculation. (R at 84-85). She was the sole arbiter as to what to include in her presentence
report. (Tr. at 86). She states that she gave much of the material she "cut and pasted" into the
presentence report "very little weight". (Tr. at 86). Later, she admitted that the portions that she
"cut and pasted" into the report were "significant." (Tr. at 87). Also, for her recommendations,
she stated she relied on the psychosexual evaluation from Dr. Lindsey. (Tr. at 89). But, when
the updated recommendations came in, she disagreed with reliance upon Dr. Lindsey, and the
updated recommendations. (Tr. at 94).
She did no independent research to "verify" whether Mr. Cox was a "sociopath", a
"predator", or someone that is obsessed with "woman, pornography and sex". (Tr. at 88). She
also disregarded the polygraphs by which Mr. Cox showed no deception as to molesting his
daughter, other victims, and guilty of other sexually related crimes. (Tr. at 89-90). She was
aware that of the Rule 11 agreement in the case, and that Court was bound by her
recommendations. (Tr.at 91). Mr. Cox's counsel argued:
Counsel: Your Honor, it is the same argument that was made before. The Rule is
clear. It states, "That this type of material, the conjecture and speculation should
not be included in the presentence report." And I pointed in my briefing, and I
think the statement that that stuff is not conjecture and speculation, is just
ludicrous. There is absolutely nothing in the record. There is absolutely nothing
in this PSI that supports that fact that he was an experienced sexual predator; that
he leads a double life; that there are multiple victims. This is an extremely
inflammatory language, and for someone to say, "Look I can compartmentalize
all that and not rely upon that in making a conclusion in a case like this." I would
submit that as impossible .....
Counsel: It is one thing to receive a letter and then it is entirely a different thing to
pick and choose portions of that letter, put it in your presentence report, and then
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say, "I don't rely upon it." ... She cut and pasted it into the report. She says now
that she didn't rely upon it, yet it is in her report. The Rule is clear that it is not
suppose to be there. It is not supposed to be there and why? We need to talk
about a little bit about the policy as to why is that. There [are] actually two really
good policy reasons why that stuff shouldn't be in there. The first policy reason
is, is that one, the ultimate hearer on that, the Court, should not be relying on that
information that is found in the presentence report ... That is the one policy
consideration. The second policy consideration is and it is one that we made in
the ... we want a fair and unbiased report, and when we get conjecture and we get
speculation and we include it in our report and we look at the accumulation of all
the information that we are bombarded with, and we-there is absolutely no way
that she could divorce herself from these types of allegations. And there is
nothing to rely on for those allegations. There is nothing to rely on. He passed the
polygraph on all those issues, and there really-there have not been any other
victims that have come forward and said-stated these things. I mean he is called
a sexual predator in here-that is pretty inflammatory language, and it is
conjecture and speculation. It has no place in this presentence report.
Couple that with the fact that with this Rule 11 binding plea agreement that she
was aware of, and I understand that she was made aware of from my own client,
but she was going to be made aware of that anyway. She needed to maintain
fairness and unbiasedness (sic) throughout this process. It was extremely
imperative for this presentence investigation to do that, and Your Honor, we
simply believe that given this information, that fact that she stated that she really
didn't rely on that but she did rely on it, it is insignificant, but yet it is significant.
She gives the Court significant pause in whether to go forward today, and frankly,
we think this should be submitted as we asked in the last hearing, to submitted to
a separate PSI with a specific instruction to not include that information in the
report and not to consider that information.
(Tr. at 97-99).

The Court stated, in its ruling:
I will note on the record that sometime during the course of this process, Ms.
Osborn contacted my office, and was concerned about the number of people that
were wanting to make comment and be included in the presentence investigation
report. My office instructed her that she should conduct the presentence
investigation in accordance with Rule 32 and with the accordance of her normal
procedure. So at the early stages of this matter, Ms. Osborn was inundated with a
lot of people who expressed a lot of opinions about this issue and it was a very
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difficult task, and I certainly recognize the struggle and the difficulty Ms. Osborn
had with respect to completing this presentence investigation report.
(Tr. at 104-105).

It must be noted that these concerns referenced by the Court were not included in the
Presentence Report. The reader does not know the tenor of these statements and whether they
had impact on her conclusions.
The Court found that much of the objected to material contained conjecture and
speculation. (Tr. 107-109). The Court stated," .. .I cannot allow these statements to exist and be
in conformity with Idaho Criminal Rule 32." The Court struck the letters (and the excerpts) from
the presentence investigation, however, did not address the statements may or may not have had
on the presentence investigator as to her ultimate conclusions. (Tr. at 110-112). The Court ruled
that it could disregard the statements in the presentence report and sentence accordingly. (Tr. at
12). The Court then addressed the impact of the Rule 11 agreement. (Tr. 113-117). Mr. Cox's
counsel then requested that the Court disqualify itself based on that it had reviewed the stricken
material. (Tr. at 117). The State objected. (Tr. at 117-118). The Court denied the Motion. (Tr.
at 118-120).
The Court promised that it would not consider the prejudicial statements, and likened the
considerations to the exclusion of the material to a motion in limine in which decisions are made
on the evidence after hearing the evidence. (Tr. at 118-119).
Sentencing then proceeded, evidence was presented, and the Court entered ruling.
Ultimately, at the conclusion of arguments, the Court sentenced Dennis to a unified term of ten
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years, with three years fixed, seven years indeterminate. (Tr. at 179). A Rule 35 motion is
pending before the District Court, and is scheduled to be heard on January 12, 2012.
II. STANDARD OF APPEAL
Each of these issues are reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. (See
Idaho Code§ 19-2521; I. C.R. 32). Under is standard, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered

inquiry. The appellate court examines whether the lower court rightfully perceived the issue as
one of discretion; whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion, and
consistently with any legal standard applicable to specific choices; and whether the court reached
its decision by an exercise of reason. Absence is showing that the district court abused its
discretion and the appellate court will not disturb the challenge decision on appeal. State v.
Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 925, 854 P.2d 265, 925 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v. Hedger, 115

Idaho 598, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989).

III.

A.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

Did the Trial Court err in failing to strike the entire presentence investigation based
upon the presentence investigation containing inappropriate conjecture and
speculation, and by failing to order a new presentence investigation?
Idaho Criminal Rule 32(e)(l) states "The presentence report may include information of a

hearsay nature where the presentence investigator believes the information is reliable, and the
court may consider such information. In the trial judge's discretion, the judge may consider
material contained in the presentence report which would have been inadmissible under the rules
of evidence applicable at a trial. However, while not all information in a presentence report need
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be in the form of sworn testimony and be admissible in trial, conjecture and speculation should
not be included in the presentence report." (Idaho Criminal Rule 32(e)(l)) (emphasis added).

The Idaho Supreme Court addressed the issue of inappropriate conjecture and speculation
in State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 824 P.2d 109 (1991). Mauro pled guilty to an offense in
December, 1987. Mauro, 121 Idaho at 182. An initial presentence report was created, and that it
recommended probation. Id. Due to federal charges pending, the matter was continued much
later, and as a result, a new presentence report was created. Id. The new presentence report had
extensive detail listing Mauro as a major drug dealer, and recommended extensive incarceration.
Id.

At the sentencing, Mauro's counsel strenuously objected to the inclusion of the new
information in the presentence report. Id. As is the case in hand, Mauro argued that there was
impermissible conjecture and speculation included in the presentence report, and that the PSI
constituted "an innuendo as to other crimes". Id.
Apparently, in Mauro, the presentence investigator relied on information from the United
States attorney's office in conjunction with the Federal case that was pending. Id at 183. The
impermissible conjecture and speculation relied upon in the presentence report contained
information of intensive drug dealing, prostitution, and other negative criminal innuendo. Id at
182.

The presentence investigator did nothing but review the file, and did not provide a

substantial basis for why it was included in the presentence report, nor was any indication given
as to why it was reliable. Id at 182-183. The Idaho Supreme Court held:
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The fact that much of the information came from the files of the United States
attorney's office does not mean that it is per se reliable. That source does not
necessarily ensure that the information is not conjecture or speculation. Without
an explanation from the presentence investigator why he believed that the hearsay
information was reliable, or indication by the trial court that he was not relying
on, we conclude that the presentence report contained too much speculation and
conjecture, and too little support for why the presentence investigator believed
that the hearsay information was reliable, to comply with I.C.R. 32(e).
Accordingly, the sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded to the district
court for resentencing after first obtaining a new presentence investigation report
in compliance with I.C.R. 32(e).

Id at 183. (emphasis added).
Correspondingly, defense counsel made motion to disqualify the judge based on his
review of the "slanderous" comments. The court denied said motion. Id at 183. The Supreme
Court held that the motion to disqualify did not comply with LC.R. Rule 25, and that judge made
statements that he would not consider the inappropriate comments.
Mostly, Mauro is on point with Mr. Cox's case. In Dennis's case, the presentence
investigator, Nicole Osborn, acquired letters from various sources, including Dermis's ex-wives.
Dennis's ex-wives were not victims, nor did they have any independent or individual knowledge
of the facts involved with this case. Apparently, with an axe to grind, the ex-wives designated

Mr. Cox as a sexual monster, predator, and a person that has abused many children in the past,
and will do so in the future.

The real evidence, including the polygraph examinations and

psychosexual evaluation, do not support these contentions in any fashion.
The Court, after reviewing the presentence investigation, concluded that these slanderous
allegations were conjecture and speculation. In fact, at first, the District Court agreed to strike
the entire presentence investigation, to allow a new presentence investigation to be conducted
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absent the conjecture and speculation, with a presentence investigator from a different
jurisdiction. The Court stated that the legitimacy of the presentence investigation was suspect.
Furthermore, the Court correctly stated that due to the interplay with the Rule 11 agreement, this
case presented interesting and complex issues.
Upon argument from the State, the Court relented on the ruling to strike, and gave the
presentence investigator an opportunity to testify to the Court to explain why she included the
conjecture and speculation in the presentence report, and why such reliance was appropriate.
The testimony given by the presentence investigator at the hearing wa<; enlightening.
Ms. Osborn indicated that she had fifteen years of experience and had in-depth training as to how
to interpret Rule 32.

She stated she would not include conjecture and speculation without

verification, yet did nothing to verify except take it at face value. However, she could not grasp
the basic concept of what "conjecture and speculation" is, and would not concede that the
statements made by the ex-wives were inappropriate in this setting. During cross-examination,
she made several inconsistent statements about whether she relied on the letters (and the
conjecture and speculation) to render her ultimate recommendations.
At first, she seemed to downplay that the information that she acquired from the ex-wives
were just ex-wives with "axes to grind".

However, instead of just leaving the letters as

attachments to the presentence investigation, she took the most inflammatory pieces of
conjecture and speculation, and "cut and pasted" them directly into the presentence report.
When a<;ked if these statements were significant, she initially stated they were not, and then
changed her mind and indicated that they were significant. When asked exactly what she relied
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upon to find those conjecture and inflammatory statements reliable, she could point to nothing in
the file that supported the contention that Dennis was a sexual predator, with multiple victims,
was psychotic, and if left free, would abuse children. She stated that because one of the ex wives
was married to him for 10 years, that she could proffer an "opinion" as to his sexual deviance.
There was absolutely no indicia of reliability for including these statements in the presentence
report.
The Idaho Supreme Court held in State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 261 P.3d 850 (2011),
the PSI" ... [T]he report is to be a neutral document and not an opportunity to simply advocate
for the State's position. However, the primary purpose of a PSI is to assist the district court in
sentencing." Id.
This presentence report was extremely important in this case. Courts request to give the
sentencing court all of the information necessary to fashion and foster a just sentence. The
policy behind the I.C.R. Rule 32 report is to give the court the full picture, in an unbiased
fashion, as to the history of the defendant, the ability of the defendant to be rehabilitated, and the
extent of retribution, as it extends to the theories of punishment. The presentence investigator
does not work for the State, and the presentence investigator does not work for the defense. The
presentence investigator is charged with keeping her objectivity and neutrality, and to give the
court a clear idea of the defendant, and what sentence should be appropriate.
Here, the presentence report was even more important in that the she had tremendous
control over the outcome of the case. The Rule 11 Binding Plea Agreement bound the Court to
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sentence no harsher than the recommendation of the presentence report, and, that the State was
not allowed above and beyond the recommendations of the presentence report.
Here, as was admitted by the Court in its ruling on whether to exclude the presentence
report, Ms. Osborn was bombarded with information. Although we do not know the chronology
of this "bombardment", it is likely that she received the letters and had telephone calls with the
ex-wives, who were seeking vengeance, prior to ever meeting with Dennis Cox. Given the
information that she received, she had to believe she was going to interview a skilled and proven
sexual predator - before she met with him at all. She would have been naturally pre-disposed to
dislike Mr. Cox.
Furthermore, she was aware of the Rule 11 plea agreement, and the power that she held.
She took an immediate disliking to Dennis Cox by virtue of his "body language" and perceived
"arrogance" in her personal interview.

These feelings may have been impacted by the

preconceived notions of the conjecture and speculation that she received alleging that Dennis
was some type of sexual monster.
The presentence investigator relied heavily upon the psychosexual evaluation of Dr.
Lindsey. She quotes, on page 15 of the document, every negative reference from Dr. Lindsey's
report that she could find. However, during cross-examination, when she was asked specifically
if she had received the addendum report by which Dr. Lindsey was no longer recommending
prison, she emboldened and was immoveable in her recommendations.
By virtue that she "cut and pasted" the inflammatory provisions directly into here report,
and she would not admit that it was conjecture and speculation when crossed, gives clear
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indication that she did in fact rely upon it. She included information of a nature that the judge
should have never reviewed. She couldn't possibly have read that and not been moved by it.
Furthermore, consider if the ex-wives were called to testify at the sentencing hearing as
to these "opinions". Counsel would have objected to the relevance, and, if the District Court
were to rule properly, the "opinions" would have been kept from introduction. Why? These
opinions are immaterial in the sentencing context. From a policy consideration, we simply do
want to allow a judge to be biased on inflammatory and unreliable information.
After the presentence investigator testified, the District Court Judge agreed that the letters
from the ex-wives (and excerpts pasted into the report itself) contained too much conjecture and
speculation, and were inherently unreliable. Rather than striking the presentence investigation,
to see if after the conjecture and speculation was removed, if a different presentence investigator
would render different conclusions, the Court elected to "red line" the letters in the portions of
the presentence investigation referenced by the objection. This was done even though the Court
previously stated the legitimacy of the report. Despite these previous reservations, the Court
allowed the conclusions to remain.
Unfortunately, this did not remedy the error, and this caused harm to Dennis Cox. A
house built of faulty materials and a weak foundation will inevitably fall. By allowing the
conclusions to remain, Dennis's Rule 11 Agreement was deemed null and void, and worthless. It
is quite possible that if Dennis knew, prior to entering this plea, that the presentence
investigation was going to be conducted in such a fashion, that he would never been enticed to
enter the agreement, and would have taken his chances at trial.
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A presentence investigator who reviews, and relies, on such statements should have been
precluded from making any recommendations. The Court erred when it did not the strike the PSI
in its entirety and allow a new presentence investigation report.

This case is extremely similar

to Mauro and the remedy should have been exactly the same.
In other cases, which have applied the Mauro reasoning, such as State v. Dowalo, 122

Idaho 761, 838 P.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1992), and State v. Siva, 127 Idaho 387, 901 P.2d 494 (1995),
the case at hand is distinguishable. In those cases, the courts upheld the failure to strike the PSI
on the grounds that presentence investigator provided a state as to why they felt the hearsay or
conclusory statement was reliable.

Here, the presentence investigator did not believe the

statements to be reliable, yet in reaching her conclusions, still relied upon them. She relied upon
this apparently by cutting and pasting the relevant provisions into the text of the presentence
report.
Another case, State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950 (Ct. App. 2010), involves inappropriate
inclusion of material of a conjecture and hearsay nature in presentence investigation. In this
case, the PSI included in an unsubstantiated report of sexual abuse perpetrated by a defendant,
which was wholly unreliable. Id at 961. The court agreed that the information was unreliable
and believed that the material should be stricken. Id at 961. Apparently, the Court in the case at
bar relied on Molen, and State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 971 P.2d 327 (1998). The court in
Molen indicated that it would not consider the prohibited material, and then found that the
appropriate procedure was to "redline" the report in which he physical retraction of the material
is taken from the presentence investigation. Id at 961-962.
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However, in Mr. Cox's case, this procedure fails. The binding Rule 11 agreement was
relying on the presentence investigator to comply with Rule 32, and to not rely upon
inappropriate material in reaching her conclusions. Therefore, the inquiry is different. This is
not a matter of whether the Court can strike the material, and disregard it. It is a matter of
whether the presentence investigator could.

In this case, based on the testimony that the

presentence investigator gave, it is obvious that she could not. Therefore, the presentence
investigation should have been stricken, in its entirety, and a presentence investigation, without
the inflammatory material being included, should have been ordered.
B.

Did the Court err by failing to disqualify itself, upon motion by counsel, after it had
reviewed prejudicial material in the presentence investigation report?

Here, after the Court ruled that it would strike the prejudicial conjecture and speculation
from the presentence report, the Court was asked to disqualify itself based on its review of the
material.

The Court denied the motion on the grounds that it could compartmentalize the

inappropriate material in the presentence report, and not consider it.
In Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 752, 250 P.3d 803, 815-16 (Ct.

App. 2011 ), the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed the standards for disqualification of a judge:
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(2)(A)(4) provides for disqualification for
cause if the presiding judge is "biased or prejudiced for or against any party or the
case in the action." In United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct.
1698, 1710, 16 L.Ed.2d 778, 793 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held
that to be disqualifying, the alleged bias or prejudice "must stem from an
extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other
than what the judge learned from his participation in the case." For a number of
years Idaho appellate courts followed the Grinnell standard. Samuel v. Hepworth,
Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 88, 996 P.2d 303, 307 (2000); State,
Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 133 Idaho 826, 829, 992 P.2d 1226, 1229
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(Ct.App.1999); Hays v. Craven, 131 Idaho 761, 763, 963 P.2d 1198, 1200
(Ct.App.1998); State v. Elliott, 126 Idaho 323, 329, 882 P.2d 978, 984
(Ct.App.1994); Liebelt v. Liebelt, 125 Idaho 302, 306, 870 P.2d 9, 13
(Ct.App.1994); Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 27, 29, 813 P.2d 366, 368
(Ct.App.1991). However, both the United States Supreme Court and the Idaho
Supreme Court have abandoned this approach. In Liteky v. United States, 510
U.S. 540, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994), the Court held that "[t]he fact
that an opinion held by a judge derives from a source outside judicial proceedings
is not a necessary condition for 'bias or prejudice' recusal, since predispositions
developed during the course of a trial will sometimes (albeit rarely) suffice. Nor is
it a sufficient condition for 'bias or prejudice' recusal, since some opinions
acquired outside the context of judicial proceedings (for example, the judge's
view of the law acquired in scholarly reading) will not suffice." Id. at 554, 114
S.Ct. at 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d at 490 (emphasis in original).
Recently, in Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P.3d 1146 (2010), the Idaho
Supreme Court, following the reasoning of Liteky, implicitly overruled the prior
Idaho cases. Our Supreme Court held that whatever the source of the bias or
prejudice, it must be "so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair
judgment," that "unless there is a demonstration of 'pervasive bias' derived either
from an extrajudicial source or facts and events occurring at trial, there is no
basis for judicial recusal." Id. at 791-92, 229 P.3d at 1153-54 (emphasis added).
The Court stated that "the standard for recusal of a judge, based simply on
information that he has learned in the course of judicial proceedings, is extremely
high." Id. at 792, 229 P.3d at 1154.
The Court in Doe, although ruling for a reversal on other grounds, advised in the remand
that the Court should consider disqualifying itself for the future proceedings. Id.
As stated, the Court read, in a presentence report information that was wholly
inappropriate, to the level that the Court took the unusual step of redlining and deleting the
material. The material deleted was inflammatory. It was highly prejudicial. Reading it has to
have an impact on the reader.
Here, the Court likened this to a motion in limine, by which the Court reviews material
possibly inadmissible to a jury, to determine whether the evidence should be introduced.
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However, there is a large distinction. In a sentencing scenario, the Court is the ultimate finder of
fact. In the scenario the Judge addressed, the jury is the finder of fact. The court simply plays
the referee as to what evidence complies with the rules. When the Court determines whether
someone spends 3 years in prison, and the choice is the Court's alone, we must be absolutely
certain that the court can be fair and unbiased.
Based on the Court's failure to disqualify itself, this court should reverse the sentence,
and set for re-sentencing, with a new judge that has not reviewed the prejudicial material.
C.

Did the District Court err when it sentenced Dennis Cox to ten years unified, three
years.fixed, seven years indeterminate?

The Idaho Court of Appeals addressed whether a sentence was appropriate, in State v. Carrasco.
It held:

When a sentence is challenged on appeal we examine the record, focusing on the
offense and the character of the offender, to determine if there has been abusive
sentencing court's discretion. State v. Young, 119 Idaho 510, 808 P.2d 429 (Ct.
App. 1991). Where a sentence is within the statutory limits, the appellant bears
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Hedger,
115 Idaho 598, 604, 768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989). The Defendant bears the
burden to show that sentence is unreasonably harsh in light of the primary
objective of protecting society and the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992); State v.
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). An abuse of
discretion will be found only in light of governing criteria, the sentence is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho
497, 500, 861 P.2d 67, 70 (1993).

State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 338, 757 P.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1988).
In State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 757 P.2d (Ct. App. 1988), the Court addressed

whether the district court abused its in pronouncing its sentence. The court stated in citing the

Toohill decision, "A term of confinement is reasonable to the extent it appears necessary at the
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time of sentencing to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. A sentence longer than
necessary for these purposes is unreasonable and may represent a clear abuse of discretion."
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982).
In support of mitigation, the defendant argued that he was a first time offender, and that

his role in the crime was minor. Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 352. Several people came forward and
testified as to his good reputation. Id. Regardless of the sentence being a legal sentence, the
Carrasco Court found that the penalty was harsh for a first time offender. Id at 352. In a

concurring opinion, Justices Burnett and Swanstrom stated, "Nevertheless, it remains our
responsibility at the appellate level to review the facts independently, focusing not only upon the
nature of the offense but also upon the character of the offender." Id at 353-354 (citing State v.
Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1982)). The court analyzed the theories of

punishment, and applied the theories of punishment to the facts at hand - and reduced his
sentence. Id at 354-355.
In the case at hand, Dennis Cox was a fifty-three year old man at the time of sentencing.

He had nary a criminal charge prior to these allegations. He was truly a first time offender under
a Toohill analysis. In mitigation, the psychosexual evaluator recommended probation. Dennis
gave a heartfelt apology for his conduct and the pain that he had caused the victim. The
psychosexual evaluation, by virtue of the polygraphs, indicated that there were no other victims,
and Mr. Cox was at a low risk of re-offense. The charges were reduced from lewd conduct and
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rape to one single charge of injury to child. The polygraph indicated that many of the allegations
that the victim were making were simply untrue.
The District Court seemed to have a natural predisposition against crimes of a sex related
nature. Some of comments in the verbal ruling indicate this. The Toohill decision, and the other
cases such as Carrasco, emphasize that each crime is different, and a term confinement must be
no longer than necessary to achieve the theories of punishment. Given Dennis's lack of criminal
history, and other mitigating factors, a unified sentence of ten years, with three years being fixed
was excessive given all the circumstances. This Court should modify this judgment and remand
to the district court address this inappropriate sentencing.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the presentence report should have been stricken in its
entirety. The presentence investigator included conjecture and speculation in her report. This
violated Rule 32 I.C.R. The Court ruled that the speculation and conjecture did in fact violate
Rule 32.

Due to the binding plea agreement being so hopelessly intertwined with the

presentence report, the remedy chosen did not correct this error. The Court was initially correct
in its ruling to strike the PSI, and when it ordered a new one.
Furthermore, when Mr. Cox requested for the Court to disqualify itself, based on the
Courts review of the extrajudicial statements in the PSI, to insure fairness, the motion should
have been granted.
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Finally, given the Toohill factors, the sentence was overly harsh and inappropriate given
that Dennis was a first time offender, and was capable of being rehabilitated pursuant to the
psychosexual evaluation.
For all of these reasons, the sentence should be reversed, and remanded to the Court, with
a new sentencing judge, with an order for a new presentence investigation from a new
jurisdiction.
DATED thiJ.-1 day of November, 2011.
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